In this paper, we review a well-known phenomenon of »me-too« drugs in the pharmaceutical branded markets, which has gained wide attention during the recent years. A branded “me-too” drug is deemed having somewhat similar therapeutic effect as the “breakthrough” drug, although from an intellectual property right perspective, there is no difference between the two. Definition of “me-too” drugs has yet to reach consensus and it would likely be ferociously disputed by the branded firms. When the first branded »me-too« drug enters the market, we are dealing with oligopoly, or more precisely, duopoly, described by Cournot model. From an oligopoly model, we would expect at Nash equilibrium both price to decrease and total volume to increase compared to shared monopoly conditions. An oligopolistic structure of a »me-too« pharmaceutical market puts substantial emphasis on branding and promotion (to achieve horizontal differentiation), which is often cited (beside R&D costs) as the second barrier to entry to the branded market. Here, we have discussed several examples of Cournot model within various ATC4 groups and jurisdictions. We have also critically examined preponderance of »me-too« entries, particularly in the light of an R&D investment of the branded firms. Historically, »me-too« drugs are more ubiquitous than often realized by regulatory agencies, payers, and also the pharmaceutical industry itself. This unfortunately presents an inefficient use of resources as the breakthough innovation is nowadays, in the time of austerity measures, a real necessity. The models that would give incentives to the industry to invest in R&D for breaktrough therapies are possible and would not only contribute to optimization of societal welfare but would also in the long run increase an R&D productivity of branded firms.