OBJECTIVES: We study the effect of the type of negotiations concerning the price allocation of the combination therapy (CT) among the manufacturers of the components of the CT on the manufacturers’ incentives to invest into the development of alternative therapies (mono or combination) for the same indication as a given CT. Moreover, we examine the welfare consequences of different types of price negotiations. The types of negotiations differ depending on a set of its participants. METHOD: We analyze the question of interest in a game-theoretic framework with one combination therapy {ab} consisting of two components: component {a} (produced by manufacturer A) and component {b} (produced by manufacturer B). Manufacturer A invests into the development of the CT {ab}. Two types of CT price allocation between A and B are examined. Under the first scenario, only A negotiates with the health care provider about the part of the value created by {ab} that it appropriates, while B receives a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the health care provider concerning the price it gets. Under the second scenario, both A and B participate in the price negotiations with the health care provider. RESULTS: We demonstrate that the switch from the first type of negotiations to the second one reduces B's incentives to invest into the development of alternatives therapies for the same indication as CT {ab}. Therefore, the patients may be worse-off under the second type of negotiations. Manufacturer B always prefers the second type of negotiations, while for A it is ambiguous: depending on the parameter values of the model A's profit is higher either under the first or under the second type of negotiations. CONCLUSION: The choice of the type of the negotiations used in the CT value distribution leads to different welfare outcomes.