SHAREHOLDERS AND COMMON OWNERSHIP IN THE MARKET FOR MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES: A NETWORK ANALYSIS
Author(s)
André S. Motta-Santos, PhD1, Korshed Alam, PhD2, Kenya V. Noronha, PhD3, Jeffrey Gow, PhD2, Leonardo C. Ribeiro, PhD3, Mônica V. Andrade, PhD3;
1Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais and University of Southern Queensland, PhD Candidate, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 2University of Southern Queensland, School of Business, Toowoomba, Australia, 3Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Department of Economics, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
1Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais and University of Southern Queensland, PhD Candidate, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 2University of Southern Queensland, School of Business, Toowoomba, Australia, 3Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Department of Economics, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
OBJECTIVES: To investigate common ownership, where multiple firms share major investors, in the mAb innovation market.
METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional network analysis of ownership ties in the mAb market. For the breadth analysis, two network models were developed: (1) an undirected network to map power, influence, and strategic position and (2) a directed network to capture directional influence between shareholders and companies. For the common ownership analysis, a unimodal network linking shareholders was built, with common ownership ratios calculated for both investors and firms.
RESULTS: It is evident that the power of companies is relatively more prominent in the network compared to their structural placement or influence. Shareholders, on the other hand, tend to occupy more strategic positions within the network and are often connected to highly influential nodes in a directional manner. The common ownership analysis showed that some shareholders are better connected than others, with BlackRock, UBS, and JPMorgan Chase gaining the most prominent common. In terms of companies, Abbott, Eli Lilly, BMS, Biogen, Pfizer, and Amgen were the companies with the most influent shareholders in the network. The observed concentration of power and influence in the hands of a few key players suggests the possible existence of a rich-club phenomenon that directs decisions in the mAb innovation market.
CONCLUSIONS: Common ownership in the mAb market is highly concentrated, with a handful of investors shaping competitive dynamics, governance, and potentially innovation. These findings highlight the need to examine how financial concentration influence drug development, pricing, and access.
METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional network analysis of ownership ties in the mAb market. For the breadth analysis, two network models were developed: (1) an undirected network to map power, influence, and strategic position and (2) a directed network to capture directional influence between shareholders and companies. For the common ownership analysis, a unimodal network linking shareholders was built, with common ownership ratios calculated for both investors and firms.
RESULTS: It is evident that the power of companies is relatively more prominent in the network compared to their structural placement or influence. Shareholders, on the other hand, tend to occupy more strategic positions within the network and are often connected to highly influential nodes in a directional manner. The common ownership analysis showed that some shareholders are better connected than others, with BlackRock, UBS, and JPMorgan Chase gaining the most prominent common. In terms of companies, Abbott, Eli Lilly, BMS, Biogen, Pfizer, and Amgen were the companies with the most influent shareholders in the network. The observed concentration of power and influence in the hands of a few key players suggests the possible existence of a rich-club phenomenon that directs decisions in the mAb innovation market.
CONCLUSIONS: Common ownership in the mAb market is highly concentrated, with a handful of investors shaping competitive dynamics, governance, and potentially innovation. These findings highlight the need to examine how financial concentration influence drug development, pricing, and access.
Conference/Value in Health Info
2026-05, ISPOR 2026, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Value in Health, Volume 29, Issue S6
Code
HPR34
Topic
Health Policy & Regulatory
Topic Subcategory
Health Disparities & Equity, Pricing Policy & Schemes, Reimbursement & Access Policy
Disease
STA: Biologics & Biosimilars