OBJECTIVES Payments for Performance (P4P) schemes are commonly used in many OECD countries in order to incite physicians to improve both quality and efficiency of prescribing. In France, a set of 29 indicators has been selected as the P4P perimeter by National Public Health Insurance. P4P schemes may induce undesirable behaviors from GPs leading to a decrease both in quality and efficiency outside the P4P perimeter (De Pouvourville, 2013). On the contrary, other studies (Campbell et al., 2009) tend to show that respecting P4P targets may imply a virtuous effect outside P4P.  METHODS Database used in this study were taken from the IMS-Health Disease Analyzer (DA) database. It contains information on pharmaceutical prescriptions administered by 693 French General Practitioners and related diagnoses.  Quality and efficiency indicators are calculated both inside and outside P4P perimeter.  In a first step, each category –quality or efficiency- is considered separately. We calculate an aggregated score for each category, by averaging indicators pertaining to it.  In a second step, each indicator outside the P4P perimeter is regressed on quality or efficiency aggregated scores, controlling for other characteristics of the physician.   RESULTS At first sight, there is no obvious link between quality and efficiency scores inside and outside P4P perimeter. As a matter of fact, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and Principal Component Analysis do not show any straightforward relation. All these first results call for further analyses.    CONCLUSIONS Results from this analysis may have implications for public policy design.  If respecting P4P targets imply a virtuous effect outside P4P, there is no need to extend the P4P perimeter.  If not, regulatory agency has to increase the number of indicators in order to improve quality and efficiency.