OBJECTIVES: Generic competition is an effective cost-containment mechanism that improves static efficiency and stimulates pharmaceutical innovation. No prior study has empirically analysed the relative delays in adoption of generic competition within the OECD. This study aims to investigate how price regulations in the OECD affect timing of generic adoption following the first global generic launch. METHODS: Drawing upon data from 1999 to 2008, we estimate the impact of ex-ante price and market size expectations on the probability of generic launch using discrete-time duration modeling with cloglog and logit regressions. The econometric strategy employs both parametric and non-parametric duration dependence and includes controls for local generic competition, firm characteristics and molecule heterogeneity.  RESULTS: Ex-ante profit expectations result in faster adoption; both expected price and market size increase the probability of launch. Our findings suggest that neither molecule nor firm characteristics have a significant effect on generic adoption across different specifications CONCLUSIONS: Evidence indicates that regulation has a significant impact on timing of adoption; however, generic competitors tend to follow a locally oriented strategy in contrast to research-intensive pharmaceutical firms