# Incorporating evidence on effect-heterogeneity in CEA

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#### THE CHOICE INSTITUTE

**School of Pharmacy** 

### Background

#### > Cost-effectiveness analysis is beginning to play a major role in decision-making for private and some public plans in the US

CVS Caremark is initiating a program that allows clients to exclude any drug launched at a price of greater than \$100,000 per QALY from their plan. The QALY ratio is determined based on publicly available analyses from the

Current and New Approaches to Making Drugs More Affordable August 2018





management sparks debate

Nov 19, 2017

in 8+

Benefit design and pricing, Benefit design and pricing, Business Strategy, Business Strategy, Contracting, MHE Articles, Pharmacy, Pharmacy, Pharmacy Best Practices, Pharmacy Strategy





#### Criticisms

September 12, 2018

Mr. Larry J. Merlo President and Chief Executive Officer CVS Health One CVS Drive Woonsocket, Rhode Island 02895

Dear Mr. Merlo:

ACCSES Aimed Alliance Alliance for Aging Research Alliance for Patient Access American Academy of Nursing American Academy of Ophthalmology American Association of People with Disabilities Association of University Centers on Disabilities Autism Society of America Autistic Self Advocacy Network Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law Beyond Type 1 Black Women's Health Imperative Bladder Cancer Advocacy Network Brain Injury Association of America California Consortium of Addiction Programs and Professionals Cancer Support Community CancerCare CARE About Fibroids Center for Autism and Related Disorders Center for Public Representation Cutaneous Lymphoma Foundation Davis Phinney Foundation Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance **Diabetes Patient Advocacy Coalition** Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund Epilepsy Association of North Carolina Epilepsy Foundation

Epilepsy Foundation – Alabama

Epilepsy Foundation Maryland

Epilepsy Foundation Nebraska

Epilepsy Foundation Northwest

Epilepsy Foundation of Arizona

Epilepsy Foundation of Colorado

Epilepsy Foundation of Connecticut

Epilepsy Foundation New England

Epilepsy Foundation Metropolitan Washington

Epilepsy Foundation of Georgia Epilepsy Foundation of Greater Los Angeles Epilepsy Foundation of Greater Southern Illinois Epilepsy Foundation of Indiana Epilepsy Foundation of Iowa Epilepsy Foundation of Kentuckiana Epilepsy Foundation of Michigan Epilepsy Foundation of Middle and West Tennessee Epilepsy Foundation of Minnesota Epilepsy Foundation of Missouri and Kansas Epilepsy Foundation of Nevada Epilepsy Foundation of Northeastern New York, Inc. Epilepsy Foundation of Oklahoma Epilepsy Foundation of Vermont Epilepsy Foundation Ohio Epilepsy Foundation Utah Genetic Alliance Global Liver Institute Global Healthy Living Foundation Health Hats Illinois Association of Behavioral Health International Foundation for Autoimmune & Autoinflammatory Arthritis Iudv Olsen Kidney Cancer Association Lung Cancer Alliance LUNGevity Foundation Lupus and Allied Diseases Association, Inc. LvmeDisease.org Men's Health Network Mended Hearts Mental Health America National Alliance on Mental Illness National Infusion Center Association National MPS Society National Multiple Sclerosis Society National Patient Advocate Foundation No Health without Mental Health Not Dead Yet Partnership to Improve Patient Care Patrick Gee Pediatric Congenital Heart Association PXE International RetireSafe

Rosie Bartel Roxanne Davenport TASH The AIDS Institute The Arc of the United States The Asthma and Allergy Foundation of America The diaTribe Foundation The National Council on Independent Living The Veterans Health Council Tuberous Sclerosis Alliance U.S. Pain Foundation United Cerebral Palsy United Spinal Association Vietnam Veterans of America

Therefore, we request that you reconsider this decision. CVS Health's stated purpose is "helping people on their path to better health." Reliance on cost-effectiveness thresholds like ICER's falls short of this purpose, replacing deeply personal, individual health care decisions with an opaque algorithm based on average study results that do not address the needs of different patients and special populations.

#### **Premise**

> Relying on average cost-effectiveness of a new technology have been criticized in the presence of heterogeneity

- > Consider three issues in this talk:
  - Stochastic (first-order) uncertainty vs variability
  - Implication for learning by doing
  - Demand-weighted cost-effectiveness analysis
    - > Its relationship to indication-based pricing



#### Stochastic (first-order) uncertainty vs variability

- > Stochastic (first-order) uncertainty
  - Represents uncertainty in subject-level outcomes that is entirely due to chance.
  - E.g. even if you specify that subjects have a 5% chance of death, for any single individual at any point in time, either he dies and stay alive.
- > This uncertainty is due to pure randomness (e.g. flipping a coin) UNPREDICTABLE
- > Cannot be used as a basis to allocate resources



### Stochastic (first-order) uncertainty vs variability

- > Variability
  - PREDICTABLE differences in outcomes and costs for subgroups determined by subject characteristics
- > Important for resource allocation
  - Heterogeneity may also arise due to system characteristics and also individual preferences
- > Efficient allocation of resources should try to directly incorporate variability in decision-making





······ Cost-effectiveness threshold at £30,000/QALY

Fig. 2 – Effect of improvements in health-related quality of life on the cost-effectiveness of omalizumab. The subgroups with three or more exacerbations are not shown because the curves overlap the other subgroups and the overall population. EQ-5D, EuroQol five-dimensional questionnaire; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; OCS, oral corticosteroid; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.

#### Faria et al VIH 2014



NICE National Institute for Health and Care Excellence



#### Guidance

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- 1.1 Omalizumab is recommended as an option for treating severe persistent confirmed allergic IgE-mediated asthma as an add-on to optimised standard therapy in people aged 6 years and older:
  - who need continuous or frequent treatment with oral corticosteroids (defined as 4 or more courses in the previous year), and
  - only if the manufacturer makes omalizumab available with the discount agreed in the patient access scheme.

#### https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta278/

Omalizumab for treating severe persistent allergic asthma

Technology appraisal guidance Published: 24 April 2013 <u>nice.org.uk/guidance/ta278</u>

# Learning-by-Doing



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# Learning-by-Doing: Transition of Stochastic Uncertainty to Variability

> Physician and patients learn from the random variation in outcomes

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> Develop algorithms to identify subgroups with higher/lowed than average outcome

- > Should resource allocation be generous up-front to allow for learning?
  - Fundamentally a trade-off between current health & costs and future health
  - Depends on expected quality-of-learning and the rate of learning
  - Empirical evidence suggest that learning exists but far from perfect.

HEALTH ECONOMICS Health Econ. 23: 359–373 (2014) Published online 9 October 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/hec.2996

#### HETEROGENEITY IN ACTION: THE ROLE OF *PASSIVE* PERSONALIZATION IN COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH

ANIRBAN BASU<sup>a,\*</sup>, ANUPAM B. JENA<sup>b</sup>, DANA P. GOLDMAN<sup>c</sup>, TOMAS J. PHILIPSON<sup>d</sup> and ROBERT DUBOIS<sup>e</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Department of Health Services, University of Washington, Seattle and the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA, Seattle, WA, USA

 Table II. Predicted impact of generic group atypical antipsychotic drugs (AADs) compared with branded group AADs on average number of hospitalizations in 12 months following initiation of therapy

	All hospitalizations	Schizophrenia-related hospitalizations
Group	Mean (95% CI)	Mean (95% CI)
All patients (ATE) Patients initiating therapy with generic group (TT) Patients initiating therapy with branded group (TUT)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.35 \ (0.02, \ 0.67) \\ 0.17 \ (-0.17, \ 0.44) \\ 0.61 \ (0.29, \ 1.05) \end{array}$	-0.07 (-0.28, 0.10) -0.15 (-0.38, -0.03) 0.002 (-0.13, 0.22)
TT—ATE	$\begin{array}{c} 0.61 \ (0.29, \ 1.05) \\ -0.18 \ (-0.13, \ -0.28) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \ (-0.13, \ 0.22) \\ -0.08 \ (-0.04, \ -0.12) \end{array}$

ATE, average treatment effect; TT, effect on the treated; TUT, effect on the untreated.

## **Structured learning-by doing**

#### > Centralized learning from doing

- Learning during the outcomes-based agreement
- Tuesday Poster 3:00 7:00 pm

#### > Needs structure

- Determine time for learning
- Select methods to learn faster
- Have explicit decision-making tied to the end of learning period

#### uwchoice org **QUICK FACTS & FINDINGS** BACKGROUND Pages Files EVE Pag Baye EVE Baye ental premise: OBC stopped wh isional uncertainty is resolved OBJECTIVES: For a naver's perspective, entering an mework: Value of information to decide th outcomes-based contract (OBC) can reduce risk in stimal duration of an OBC using real-time the face of uncertainty about treatment nitoring of data effectiveness. However, implementing OBC is often costly, and sustaining it may be even costlier. Little is known about the optimal duration of OBC. uide how a paver may manipulate access to ne rsus older drugs during the OBC period to nerate the required evidence in the least METHODS: A central premise for terminating an OBC is whether uncertainty about the treatment effectiveness is resolved. The optimal length of an OBC can be reduced if payers are willing to learn Methodology: sample size calculation, expected value of sample information and the Bayesian from their own data during the execution of an OBC Provis Freq EV/S Prog Exymute EV/S Dayware contract. We combine concepts from Value of daptive allocation Information methods and Bayesian designs to Main result: The average time to uncertainty compare alternative designs of learning within the solution was 1/20 to 1/70 for dynamic real-world system. Especially we compare 1) static roaches compared to static approache approaches, where sample size are determined priori, either through traditional sample size plications: Payers can shorten time to calculation or Expected Value of Sample Informatio mination of OBC by engaging in active learnin ring the OBC period (EVSI) criterion, and 2) dynamic approaches, that follow adaptive allocation of patients to treatments avers may want to steer patients to use the following evolving posterior means or posterior ent with the greatest uncertainty in i variance. Using simulated scenarios, we compare the ectiveness during the OBC period 1 1 11 12 13 14 18 18 17 18 18 2 21 22 23 24 time to resolution of uncertainty under each of these mechanisms with 1000 Monte-Carlo runs. METHODS MAIN RESULTS RESULTS SUMMARY Expected Value of Monitoring The average time to uncertainty resolution $V^* = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{10} \beta^{k-1} \cdot I \cdot ((1-p_k) \cdot \lambda_i + p_k \cdot \lambda_j) \right\} \cdot \Omega - D^*$ was 1/20 to 1/70 for dynamic approaches compared to static approaches. I = Total incident patient population every year = 2400 Among the static approaches, EVSI p. = The proportion of the patient population using approach required a shorter time. atment 8 in any period. Initially, under equal coverage of A and B, it is assumed to be 25%. If CER resolves Under the dynamic approaches, adaptive uncertainty and identifies A to be superior, then p is allocation based on posterior variance had assumed to change to 100%. If B is identified as superio p changes to zero. Such a decision change is assumed to the shortest time to uncertainty happen at the end of the CER trial. resolution L = length of the trial in years rounded to nearest integ Dynamic allocation of patients to \* round([n,\* + n,\* ]/[20\*12]). alternative treatments are found to be Ω = Monetized value of a life year. Assumed to be superior approaches as they help resolve \$100.000/year. decisional uncertainty faster than the D\* = Cost of monitoring in the real-world setting uncertainty in the true comparative effect **Comparative Designs** IMPLICATIONS DERICON Payers can shorten time to termination of OBC by engaging in active learning during the ACCUMULATED ADAPTINE 1 ADAPTINE 2 OBC period. Payers may want to steer patients to use the INFORMATION treatment that has the greatest uncertainty associated with its effectiveness during the **Data Generating Processes** OBC period. Poors Fieg EVD Pag Bayesian EVD Bayesian TILLE INFORMATION PRICE LAMPLE INFORMATION Further work requiring the application of with math calling calling methods to specific clinical scenarios will be most useful 4+148 4+148 MEL1-014 MEL1-335 m-+100 m-+500 $WetT_{40} = 1.5$ #74+1,+13 MELTING MELTING Tellar 1.5 AL-100 AL-100 Q+126 Q+100 $T_{k} = 0.0 \mu (1.5)$ esearch was supported through unrestricted funds fr 10741-0-18 0000-014 0000-000 NetText2 0-000 0-000 3 1 11 12 13 14 15 15 17 18 15 2 21 22 28 24 ortium of twelve biomedical companies to the University

MECHANISMS TO REDUCE OPTIMAL DURATION

OF OUTCOMES-BASED CONTRACTING

THE CHOICE INSTITUTE

ANIRBAN BASU, JOSH J CARLSON University of Washington, Seattle

School of Pharmary

# **Demand-weighted CEA**



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**Demand-weighted cost-effectiveness** 

> Evidence on variability is important even if

- there is no learning-by-doing

there is no opportunity to implement sub-group-based coverage

**ORIGINAL ARTICLE** 

New Metrics for Economic Evaluation in the Presence of Heterogeneity: Focusing on Evaluating Policy Alternatives Rather than Treatment Alternatives

> David D. Kim, PhD, Anirban Basu, PhD Medical Decision Making 2017



#### **ICER for Alternative Treatments**

# Typical ICER compares Treatment A vs B $ICER = \frac{E(C_A) - E(C_B)}{E(Q_A) - E(Q_B)} = \frac{E(\Delta C_{AB})}{E(\Delta Q_{AB})}$

$$= \frac{\sum_{j} \{P_j \cdot E(\Delta C_{AB,j})\}}{\sum_{j} \{P_j \cdot E(\Delta Q_{AB,j})\}} \qquad j = 1,2,3$$

 $P_i$  = Size of Subgroup *j* 

 Suppose, clear evidence on variability in ICER across subgroups.

#### **ICER for Alternative Treatments**

ICER comparing potential realized value of Treatment A vs B

$$ICER = \frac{\sum_{j} \{P_{j} \cdot \boldsymbol{D}_{j} \cdot E(\Delta C_{AB,j})\}}{\sum_{j} \{P_{j} \cdot \boldsymbol{D}_{j} \cdot E(\Delta Q_{AB,j})\}} \quad (4)$$

•  $D_j$ : the rate of adoption of treatment A in the population subgroup j

• Similar to "Volume weighted price" across indications



#### **ICER for Alternative Policies**

- The Rate of the uptake is endogenous to the policy
- So ICER should be comparing two coverage policies Policy k vs Status quo

$$ICER_{policy_k} = \frac{\sum_{j} \left\{ P_j \cdot D_{jk}(f_k) \cdot E(\Delta C_{AB,j}) \cdot f_k \right\}}{\sum_{j} \left\{ P_j \cdot D_{jk}(f_k) \cdot E(\Delta Q_{AB,j}) \right\}}$$

*f<sub>k</sub>*: a fraction of the incremental costs under a policy k borne by a payer

Parameter	Males	Females	Overall
Total costs per patient under Statin + Fibrate, \$	\$107,021	\$107,023	-
Total costs per patient under Statin Only, \$	\$98,131	\$98,131	-
Total incremental costs per patient, \$	\$8,890	\$8,892	-
Total QALYs per patient under Statin + Fibrate, \$	9.468	9.308	-
Total QALYs per patient under Statin Only, \$	9.200	9.200	-
Total incremental QALYs per patient, \$	0.268	0.108	-
Subgroup-specific ICER	\$33,130/QALY	\$82,562/QALY	-
Subgroup-specific INMB <sup>a</sup>	\$3,170	-\$4,032	
Subgroup size (P <sub>i</sub> )	0.533	0.467	
Traditional population ICER (eq. 3)			\$46,000/QALY
Population NMB per patient from statin monotherapy <sup>b</sup>			\$315,869
Adoption of Statin + Fibrate under status quo ( $f_k = 0.80$ ), $D_j$	0.072	0.043	
Modified population ICER ( $f_k = 0.80$ , eq. 7)			\$41,733/QALY
Status-quo policy NMB per patient ( $f_k = 0.80$ , eq. 8)			\$315,910
Adoption of Statin + Fibrate under Policy 2 ( $f_k = 1.0$ ), $D_j^c$	0.075	0.045	
Modified population ICER under Policy 2 ( $f_k = 1.0, eq. 7$ )			\$41,766/QALY
Policy 2 NMB per patient ( $f_k = 1.0$ , eq. 8)			\$315,911
Adoption of Statin + Fibrate under Hypothetical Policy, <sup>d</sup> D <sub>j</sub>	0.23	0.023	
Population ICER under Hypothetical Policy <sup>d</sup> (eq. 7)			\$34,848/QALY
Hypothetical Policy <sup>d</sup> NMB per patient (eq. 8)			\$316,214

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### **Future Work in CEA**

- To use demand weighted CEA at launch
  - Can we develop reliable estimates for evidence elastic of demand?
    - Discrete choice experiments
    - Retrospective analysis
    - Validated prediction model for technology diffusion
- CEA at 5 year assessment
  - Direct estimate from real-world use.



#### **Crossroads**

Decision makers focus of population averages because of the lack of reliable evidence on heterogeneity



Manufacturers argue that there is no incentive to generate evidence on heterogeneity

#### **Conclusions**

- Are we are failing to produce the necessary evidence of heterogeneity of effects, which can improve value in the society, by not providing sufficient reward incentive for such information.
- > Importantly to create an environment that respects and rewards evidence on heterogeneity.
- > Laying a clear path of incorporating reliable evidence on heterogeneity in third-party assessor's base analysis. This includes
  - not reporting population average cost-effectiveness results when there are distinct differences in subgroup-specific results,
  - experimenting with demand weighted cost-effectiveness approaches.

