Macroeconomic Regulation of Drug Expenditures in Europe : Lessons of the French Safeguard Clause From a Scoping review

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CONTEXT / RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The regulation of drug expenditures is a key concern in many European countries. In France, this is managed through various instruments, including the safeguard clause, a collective regulatory tool applied a posteriori when expenditures exceed a certain threshold. Introduced in 1999 and reformed multiple times since 2010, the contributions required from pharmaceutical companies under this clause have surged, reaching 1 billion euros in 2023.

Despite its significance, little is known about similar a posteriori regulatory mechanism in European countries.

THIS STUDY AIMS TO :

Identify and analyze comparable models of "Safeguard clause" used in other European countries. Derive lessons for the French system.



METHODS

A scoping review was conducted to explore macroeconomic levers for healthcare expenditure regulation used by European governments. The review targeted mechanisms like France's safeguard clause, involving collective and retrospective regulation of drug expenditures. Then, semi structured interviews were conducted to clarify information found in the scoping review and collect experience from French stakeholders to identify areas for improvement for the French Safeguard Clause.

╞╧┿	Scoping review conducted to identify countries of interest 2 independent reviewers + 1 external reviewer			→	Semi-structured interviews were conducted via a thematic grid	
	1. Algorithms were applied to search resources PubMed Ovid	Algorithm key words	2. Comprehensive review of grey		Areas for improvement for the	Interviewed profiles
		Drugs	literature	French S	French Safeguard Clause	Pharma Industry
		Cost containment	Data sources → posters, Academic reports, legal documents		8 questions	French government
Ľ		European countries			 	French pharma trade union

RESULTS Scoping review

Through the scoping review **27 relevant sources** were identified, including 9 articles from PubMed and Ovid databases, 13 grey literature pieces, and 5 official regulatory documents (Figure 1).


Figure 1 : Flowchart of the scoping review

Figure 2 shows the macroeconomic levers for healthcare expenditure regulation used in each European country of interest. The color of the circle represents the type of mechanism used (fixed rebate or capping), whereas the size of each circle estimates the economic impact of each mechanism in a certain country if the country uses a combination of mechanisms.

Figure 2 : Type of macroeconomic levers in each identified country








Countries identified

Through the scoping review, **six countries** of interest were identified : **France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom**.

Three categories of macroeconomic regulation emerged:

 Threshold-based models where expenditures beyond a certain limit are not fully covered by national health insurance (*France, Greece*)
Models imposing fixed rebates on all pharmaceutical industries based on revenue (*Spain*)
Mixed models incorporating both thresholds and fixed rebates (*Italy, Germany, United Kingdom*).



DISCUSSION

Collective drug expenditure regulation varies significantly across Europe. In France, the safeguard clause retroactively controls spending beyond a set threshold. Other countries, like the UK or Germany, however, uses a collective dynamic contribution or mix model for "new drugs" or "combination therapies" allowing targeted regulation of high-cost drugs. This differentiation approach enables countries to manage high-cost pharmaceutical innovations individually rather than through a pooled mechanism. Such disparities underscore the need to explore a posteriori mechanisms across countries to better address the economic impact of pharmaceutical innovation.

Semi-structured interviews highlighted ways to improve the French clause : Add predictability to the clause by multiplying debates between governments and pharma industries

Demutualize the clause to allow a better repartition of it

Add visibility to the amount to pay by transforming the clause into rebates

CONCLUSION

The increasing financial contributions required from pharmaceutical companies, through rebates or revenue caps, are leading to frequent regulatory changes. While no single approach guarantees long-term expenditure control, these evolving mechanisms demonstrate a strong governmental resolve to manage drug expenditures. Insights from this comparison can inform improvements in the French safeguard clause system.

2



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